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 In her paper, Jan Sobocan argues that the distinction commonly drawn between 
informal logic and critical thinking is a purely semantic one with no substantive basis. 
Criticizing the grounds upon which the distinction is usually based, she concludes that the 
two are essentially the same: both aim to help students to develop stronger arguments 
with respect to everyday issues. 
 There appear to be three general argumentative lines used to support this 
conclusion. One broad argument focuses on the fact that a survey of course content and 
textbooks for both informal logic and critical thinking courses reveals that there are very 
few differences between the two and that both focus primarily on reasoning. The second 
centres on the claim that the moral or dispositional dimension usually attributed solely to 
critical thinking is, in fact, an aspect of informal logic as well. The third line develops the 
argument that all thinking of a critical nature involves argument and that both informal 
logic and critical thinking are sub-species of argumentation theory. I shall deal with these 
arguments in turn. 
 
 
1. The Course Content Argument 
 
With respect to the first argument, I would argue that similarities in course and 
textbook content do not necessarily entail that informal logic and critical thinking are 
conceptually indistinguishable. Such similarities could be a function of the fact that 
critical thinking courses are frequently taught by instructors with informal logic 
backgrounds and that the title, “Critical Thinking” might have more appeal in drawing 
students than the title, “Informal Logic.” That course content may be similar does not 
necessarily indicate that there is no conceptually useful distinction to be made. Indeed, 
equating critical thinking with what is taught in a particular course may be misleading in 
that what you will get of critical thinking will only be that version or those aspects which 
can be taught in a separate course. Many theorists view critical thinking much more 
broadly, seeing it as integral to the making of judgments in many, perhaps most contexts, 
including disciplinary contexts (Siegel 1988; Paul  1990; Bailin et al. 1999). So teaching 
critical thinking may have largely to do with the approach taken to teaching the particular 
disciplines. A separate course focusing on informal logic (whatever it is called) may 
contribute to critical thinking by supplying some of the skills or resources, but the criteria 
used to make judgments in these areas are not exhausted by the argument-assessment 
criteria of informal logic. They include, as well, discipline-specific criteria and principles 
(for example the principle of control in evaluating scientific experiments, or the criterion 
of aesthetic balance in making artistic judgments).  
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Distinctions are made (or rejected) for a purpose, and I am not clear about what is 
at stake for Sobocan in rejecting the distinction between informal logic and critical 
thinking. She does not appear to be trying to sort out this distinction in order to offer 
some criticism or suggestions regarding current educational practices. Rather, she seems 
to be using the current state of educational practice as a ground for rejecting the 
distinction. I would be more inclined to make the former move, however, arguing that 
because there is an important conceptual distinction between informal logic and critical 
thinking, separate courses dealing with informal logic (whatever the title) should not be 
seen as all there is to teaching critical thinking. 
 
 
2. The Moral Dimension Argument 
 
I completely agree with Sobocan that informal logic is a normative practice, that it 
is grounded in the assumption that one ought to base one’s beliefs and actions on reasons, 
and that it is likely that most informal logic instructors attempt to instill attitudes such as 
the desire to understand, respect for other arguers, and self-criticalness. I also think that 
she makes an important point in demonstrating that there are certain values ‘built into’ 
many informal logic practices. Thus, for example, learning to consider alternative 
arguments or to avoid the straw person fallacy are, in a sense, exercises in learning 
fairmindedness. I would not, however, agree with her that teaching these principles 
equates to teaching attitudes. Students may perform these classroom activities effectively 
and yet fail to be open-minded, fairminded or self critical in their other classes or in their 
daily lives. They may not, in other words, have the generalized attitudes (dispositions, 
habits of mind) of a critical thinker. For many theorists (e.g., Siegel 1988; Paul 1990; 
Ennis 1996), the dispositional component is integral to how critical thinking is 
conceptualized. It goes beyond certain particular values which may be connected with 
some argument assessment practices. Rather, critical thinking is seen as an educational 
goal which ought to govern the making of judgments across school subjects and 
disciplinary contexts as well as in everyday situations. And it is a dispositional as well as 
a cognitive goal, involving the development of traits of character (Siegel 1988) as well as 
epistemological understanding (Bailin 1999). It is a goal which, of necessity, extends 
beyond the walls of the informal logic classroom. 
 
 
3. The Argumentation Argument 
 
 I find Sobocan’s reduction of critical thinking to argumentation problematic. One 
of the reasons why I think she makes this equation is because she views critical thinking 
almost exclusively in terms of the evaluation of belief, specifically in the context of 
disagreement or controversy. If, however, we view critical thinking, as does Lipman 
(1991), in terms of making critical judgments, then it becomes clear that critical thinking 
is involved in contexts other than the evaluation of belief.  We make critical judgments  
in situations of choice as well as disagreement, and with respect to evaluating actions, 
performing tasks, and creating products (Bailin et al. 1999). Moreover the form of the 
thinking in these cases cannot easily be forced into an argument structure. 
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These limitations to the scope of argumentation are evident in many areas, but can 
be illustrated particularly well by examples from the arts (as Govier points out). I am in 
agreement with Sobocan that we do make evaluative judgments about art and that our 
judgments are open to disagreement and critical discussion involving the giving of 
reasons. So such discussions can be examples of critical thinking. There are several 
points to be noted here, however. First, the kinds of criteria appealed to in the evaluation 
of reasons are not generally the criteria of argument assessment but are, rather, 
specifically aesthetic criteria. 
Second, the nature of and relationship between reasons and judgments is 
somewhat different than in traditional argument contexts. Aesthetic discussions serve, 
generally, to enhance the appreciation of a work rather than to arrive at an agreed upon 
judgment. An aesthetic judgment may, then, be the starting point as opposed to the 
conclusion of an aesthetic debate, “functioning to provoke re-examination rather than, in 
the usual sense, defense” (Cavell, 1970, 347). An aesthetic discussion is not so much an 
argument about the value of a work which seeks to convince through the force of reasons, 
as it is a mutual exploration of a work. And if there is movement on the part of one of the 
participants, it will be the features of the work itself which convince and not the reasons. 
The reasons serve to illuminate the particular features. Aesthetic discussion is better 
viewed as criticism rather than argument (Bailin 1993). 
The third point is that, in the realm of art or other creative endeavours, critical 
thinking is not limited to appreciation. The artist or creator also makes critical judgments 
in the process of creating a work. I would want to call this critical thinking. Yet it is 
difficult to see how we could view this activity in terms of argument.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
I stated earlier that we make distinctions for a purpose, and I would argue that the 
distinction between informal logic and critical thinking serves a useful purpose. 
Argumentation does not encompass the entire realm of critical judgment. The concept of 
critical thinking allows us to point to the criticalness of various kinds of judgments in 
many areas of human endeavour. Moreover we need the concept of critical thinking in 
order to articulate a broad educational ideal, broader than what is encompassed by any 
particular set of argument assessment practices. It is an ideal with a dispositional as well 
as a cognitive component, and one that I would argue should govern educational practice 
in all areas. 
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